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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2013, the United States was hit with what some have called one 
of the most significant national security leaks in U.S. political history.1 Beginning in 
May 2013, Edward Snowden began leaking documents that detailed a massive 
surveillance program orchestrated by the National Security Agency (“NSA”).2 
Snowden then fled the country, and eventually ended up in Russia, where he has 
been granted temporary asylum.3  
Back in the United States, the exposure of the NSA surveillance program has led 
to significant public debate including concerns about civil rights,4 demands for 
reform,5 and proposed legislation.6 The United States government has also weighed 
                                                                                                                                          
 1 Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill & Laura Poitras, Edward Snowden:  The Whistleblower 
Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance. 
 2 Id.; see also Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, Boundless Informant: The NSA’s 
Secret Tool to Track Global Surveillance Data, THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining. 
 3 Isabel Gorst & Joby Warrick, Snowden Leaves Moscow Airport to Live in Russia, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/snowden-leaves-moscow-airport-to-
live-in-russia/2013/08/01/2f2d1aba-faa9-11e2-a369-d1954abcb7e3_story.html. Snowden’s asylum 
ended on July 31, 2014 at midnight. Snowden’s Asylum Status in Russia Ends, USA TODAY (Aug. 1, 
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/ news/world/2014/08/01/russia-snowden-asylum/13454055/. 
He has reapplied for asylum in Russia, and will remain there until a decision is made. Id.  
 4 Glenn Greenwald, Major Opinion Shifts, in the US and Congress, on NSA Surveillance 
and Privacy, THE GUARDIAN (July 29, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2013/jul/29/poll-nsa-surveillance-privacy-pew. A Pew poll found for the first time in a 
decade, the majority of Americans are more concerned about the government infringing on 
their civil liberties than about a potential terrorist attack. Id.  
 5 Craig Timberg, Tech Companies Urge Lawmakers to Reform NSA Programs, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/tech-companies-urge-
lawmakers-to-reform-nsa-programs/2013/10/31/f100ced6-4264-11e3-a751-f032898f2dbc_ 
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in on the incident, charging Snowden with three felonies, including two under the 
infamous Espionage Act of 19177 (“Espionage Act”).8  
This marks the eleventh time the United States has prosecuted a national security 
leaker under the Espionage Act.9 Prior to the Obama administration there had been 
three–Daniel Ellsberg, Samuel Morison, and Lawrence Franklin.10 Since Obama 
took office, there have been seven prosecutions, with Snowden marking the eighth.11 
A common theme has developed among these eight Obama prosecutions: lower-
level leaker employees are being prosecuted more frequently than higher-ranking 
officials.12 As scholars have noted, “[t]his imbalance is particularly troubling when 
the government is trying to silence the very leaks that the press and the public find 
most valuable: those that disclose what the government wants to keep secret for 
political reasons.”13 In contrast, upper-level official leaks are usually made with the 
approval of the administration.14 While potentially valuable, these leaks are usually 
one-sided in order to “shape public discourse on a given issue.”15 “Leaks by lower-
level government employees,” however, “are typically made without approval and 
often reveal serious wrongdoing in the government.”16 
This imbalance poses a significant problem for our nation: transparency is 
essential to a healthy democracy. In order to hold public officials accountable, an 
informed electorate is necessary, and an electorate that is continuously fed 
                                                                                                                                          
story.html. Facebook, Google, Apple and three other leading technology companies have called for 
substantial reforms to the U.S. government’s surveillance programs. Id. 
 6 There are now several major pieces of legislation going through Congress that would 
introduce at least some reform of the NSA. Ewen MacAskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: 
Decoded, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/ 
2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-decoded. The more far-reaching 
proposal would be the Intelligence Oversight and Reform Act, which would ban the collection 
of internet communication data, close loopholes that allow for snooping on Americans without 
a warrant, reform the FISA courts, and provide some protection for companies faced with 
handing over data to the NSA. See id. 
 7 Espionage Act of 1917 (Espionage Act), 18 U.S.C.A. § 792 (West 2014). 
 8 Politico, Document: Edward Snowden Unsealed Complaint, (June 21, 2013), available 
at http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/edward-snowden-complaint-unsealed-93181.html.  
 9 Aubrey Bloomfield, 8 Whistleblowers Charged with Violating the Espionage Act Under 
Obama, POLICY.MIC (June 23, 2013), http://www.policymic.com/articles/50459/8-
whistleblowers-charged-with-violating-the-espionage-act-under-obama. 
 10 Id.  
 11 Id.  
 12 David McCraw & Stephan Gikow, The End to an Unspoken Bargain? National Security 
and Leaks in a Post-Pentagon Papers World, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 473, 494-95 (2013). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id.  
 15 Id. at 495.  
 16 Id. McCraw and Gikow provide an example to highlight this point. “leaks about 
government-sponsored torture and the government’s widespread eavesdropping program did 
not appear to be sanctioned by high-level government officials.” Id.   
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“favorable” information by the administration is an uninformed one. Historically, 
government whistleblowers of “classified information have played an important role 
in informing the public throughout our country’s history.”17 Today’s prosecutions, 
however, have effectively deterred these important players in our nation’s history.18 
Most national security whistleblowers are afraid to enter the gray zone where 
prosecution may result.19 This reluctance not only perpetuates government abuse in 
this area, but also keeps the constituency ignorant of important public official action.   
In order to ensure that this valuable source of information remains a viable 
option, federal law should employ a multi-factor test to determine whether or not a 
defendant-leaker should be acquitted of the charges. Part II of this paper offers 
background on the current state of affairs by looking at the applicable law and how 
courts have interpreted that law. Part II also offers a more detailed look into the 
events that transpired in the summer of 2013 involving Snowden and the NSA. Part 
III introduces the reader to the proposed multi-factor test that provides a concrete 
analytical framework to evaluate each leak. Part A suggests that the leaker’s intent 
play a more significant role in the analysis. Part B details how a court would analyze 
the threat to national security the leak would cause. Part C of the analysis suggests 
that an evaluation of the recipient of the leaked information should play a 
determining influence on the conviction. Part D weighs the public debate sparked 
from the leak. After detailing each of the proposed factors, each will be applied to 
Snowden’s case as an example of how a court would employ the multi-factor test. 
Finally, Part IV offers a brief conclusion.  
II. NATIONAL SECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS AND THE CURRENT LAW TODAY  
A. Conflicting Values: Transparency v. National Security 
As mentioned briefly above, one of the keys to democracy and an informed 
public is a transparent government. In a self-governing society, citizens must know 
what their representatives are doing if they are to govern themselves intelligently. As 
Senator Ron Wyden correctly pointed out: 
It is a fundamental principle of American democracy that laws should not 
be public only when it is convenient for government officials to make 
them public. They should be public all the time, open to review by 
adversarial courts, and subject to change by an accountable legislature 
guided by an informed public. If Americans are not able to learn how 
                                                                                                                                          
 17 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National 
Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 254 (2008). For example, leaks of secret or classified 
information have led to the public discovery of several questionable practices, including the 
treatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. Id. at 255.    
 18 Leonard Downie Jr., The Obama Administration and the Press: Leak Investigations and 
Surveillance in Post-9/11 America, CPJ: COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, 2 (Oct. 10, 
2013), http://cpj.org/reports/2013/10/ 
obama-and-the-press-us-leaks-surveillance-post-911.php. 
 19 Id.  
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their government is interpreting and executing the law then we have 
effectively eliminated the most important bulwark of democracy.20  
At the same time, a completely open government may compromise our national 
security.21 Keeping certain information confidential, especially when it relates to 
national security, is necessary to keep our nation safe from the various threats of 
war. In the wake of September 11, 2001, our nation has entered a new war, a “war on 
terror.”22 Unlike before, where the United States could achieve a relative peace 
through “conventional policies of deterrence and punishment,”23 the current enemy is 
“not a nation state against which the U.S. can retaliate.”24 This new enemy is one 
willing “to commit suicide for their cause,” and has the “potential to wreak large-
scale havoc and destruction” in a variety of ways.25 As our nation has seen, “there 
appears to be no effective way to protect the nation by deterring or punishing the 
enemy.”26 Accordingly, in our objective to protect our nation, prevention of terrorist 
activities becomes all-important.27 Attempting to achieve the proper balance between 
these two conflicting ideals–transparency on one hand, security on the other—has 
proved difficult.  
In 1966, Congress tried to balance these two ideals by passing the Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”).28 The purpose behind the law was to give the public the 
right to access information concerning the federal government.29 The information 
that is accessible, however, is limited by the FOIA itself. The law specifically 
exempts those materials properly classified pursuant to Executive Orders.30 
Furthermore, it excludes from disclosure “documents that are ‘specifically exempted 
from disclosure by statute.’”31 Thus, the FOIA incorporates the “sweeping secrecy 
provisions of such statutes as the Central Intelligence Act and the National Security 
Act.”32 Beyond the fact that FOIA litigation takes a tremendous amount of time, 
money, and patience, concerned citizens must have an idea what they are looking 
                                                                                                                                          
 20 Senator Ron Wyden, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery for the Center for American 
Progress Event on NSA Surveillance (July 23, 2013), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/ 
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB436/docs/EBB-104.pdf.  
 21 Geoffrey R. Stone, On Secrecy and Transparency: Thoughts for Congress and a New 
Administration, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POLICY, 3 (2008).  
 22 George W. Bush, President, U.S., Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 
2001) (transcript available at http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/).  
 23 Stone, supra note 21, at 1.  
 24 Id.  
 25 Id.  
 26 Id. 
 27 Id.  
 28 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2014). 
 29 McCraw & Gikow, supra note 12, at 476.  
 30 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1)(A)-(B) (West 2014). 
 31 McCraw & Gikow, supra note 12, at 476.  
 32 Id. at 476-77 (citations omitted). 
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for.33 This is often impractical unless a leak has already provided information about 
the activity.34 Thus, when viewed as a whole, the current state of affairs seems to 
favor secrecy in the name of national security over transparency.35   
Executive orders provide the means through which presidents influence policy 
decisions. Since 1940, successive presidents have utilized executive orders relating 
to the classification of documents.36 The current executive order relating to 
classification is Executive Order No. 13,526.37 This Order sets out the prerequisites 
that outline how to classify documents,38 as well as the appropriate classification 
level.39 In order to classify information, four conditions must be met.40 First, an 
original classification authority (“OCA”) must classify the information.41 An OCA 
may be the president,42 vice president,43 agency heads,44 officials designated by the 
president,45 or United States government officials delegated the authority pursuant to 
this Executive Order.46 Second, the information at hand must be owned by, produced 
by or for, or under the control of the United States government.47 Third, the 
information must fall within one or more of the categories of information listed in 
                                                                                                                                          
 33 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security Leaks and 
the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 449, 471 (2014).  
 34 Id.  
 35 When FOIA is viewed in context with various statutory provisions that punish leaks of 
national security information, such as the Espionage Act discussed more fully below, it 
becomes clear that FOIA is an inadequate vehicle for asserting the right to obtain such 
information. See id. at 477.  
 36 Patricia L. Bellia, WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National Security 
Disclosures, 121 YALE L.J. 1448, 1511 (2012). 
 37 EXEC. ORDER NO. 13, 526, 75.2 C.F.R. 707 (2010). 
 38 See id. at § 1.1(a)(1)-(4).  
 39 See id. at § 1.2(a). “Top Secret” shall be applied to information, the unauthorized 
disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the 
national security that the OCA is able to identify or describe. Id. at (a)(1). “Secret” shall be 
applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonable could be expected to 
cause serious damage to the national security that the OCA is able to identify or describe. Id. 
at (a)(2). “Confidential” shall be applied to information, the authorized disclosure of which 
reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the OCA is able to 
identify or describe. Id. at (a)(3).  
 40 Id. at § 1.1(a).  
 41 Id. at § 1.1(a)(1). 
 42 Id. at § 1.3(a)(1). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at § 1.3(a)(2). 
 45 Id.  
 46 Id. at § 1.3(a)(3); see also id. at § 1.3(c) (detailing the delegation of authority process).  
 47 Id. at § 1.1 (a)(2).  
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Section 1.4 of the Executive Order.48 Fourth and finally, the OCA must determine 
that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to 
result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against 
transnational terrorism, and the OCA is able to identify or describe the damage.49  
While classifying documents pursuant to this procedure seems sound in theory, 
in practice it has led to disturbing results. As one can tell from reading Executive 
Order No. 13,526, many government officials may be classified as an OCA. 
Furthermore, the determining guidelines are subjective,50 leaving the potential for 
massive amounts of “classified” documents. This result has occurred, as many 
scholars have noted that the quantity of classified materials is prohibitively massive 
today.51 Some have estimated that anywhere between “50% and 90% of documents 
are misclassified.”52 Furthermore, without scrutinizing those classifying documents, 
there exists a huge risk that classified information may be false,53 or that the 
government exaggerates the harm that the information may present.54 Additionally, 
“the current classification scheme does not prohibit the classification of information 
revealing illegal government behavior.”55  This again adds to the abundance of 
classified information. Overclassification presents a problem56 for the courts to 
consider when analyzing national security leaks, and Part III.B offers a suggestion 
on how to address that problem.  
                                                                                                                                          
 48 Id. at § 1.1(a)(3); see also id. at § 1.4(a)-(h) (outlining the classification categories). For 
example, information shall not be considered for classification unless its unauthorized 
disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to 
national security, and it pertains to one or more of the following categories: intelligence 
activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology being one 
of them. Id. at § 1.4(c).  
 49 Id. at § 1.1(a)(4).  
 50 See also Papandrea, supra note 33, at 475 (arguing that classification is more of an art 
rather than a science, often based on subjective rather than objective considerations). 
 51 Robert Bejesky, National Security Information Flow: From Source to Reporter’s 
Privilege, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 399, 403 (2012).  
 52 McCraw & Gikow, supra note 12, at 485.  
 53 Bejesky, supra note 51, at 408. 
 54 Richard Moberly, Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The National Security 
Dilemma, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 51, 120 (2012).  
 55 Papandrea, supra note 33, at 477.  Professor Geoffrey Stone would typecast this use of 
classification as an “illegitimate government secret.” See infra Part III.B.1 for further 
explanation. 
 56 Bellia, supra note 36, at 1520 (stating that overclassification is a significant contributing 
factor for why national security leaks keep occurring). 
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B. Statutory Punishment and Protections Afforded National Security Whistleblowers  
1. The Espionage Act and the Statutory Regime Criminalizing Leaks  
By disclosing national security information, national security whistleblowers 
may face charges under the Atomic Energy Act,57 Intelligence Identities Protection 
Act,58 and the Federal Larceny Statute.59 Yet, the main source of punishment, 
although controversial, still remains the Espionage Act.60 The Espionage Act was 
passed in 1917 in order to punish acts of interference with the foreign relations, and 
the foreign commerce of the United States, to punish espionage, and to better enforce 
the criminal laws of the United States.61 Over the years, it has been applied to 
national security whistleblowers.62 
Three main sections of the Espionage Act are applicable in national security 
whistleblower cases—Sections 793, 794 and 798. Section 793 restricts the gathering, 
retention, and dissemination of national security defense information.63 It punishes 
those individuals who disseminate or retain material “willfully.”64 Furthermore, it 
punishes those who have reason to believe that information pertaining to national 
defense could injure the United States or benefit a foreign nation,65 friend or foe.66 
Finally, the way the statute is written, the information disclosed does not have to be 
                                                                                                                                          
 57 Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2011 (West 2014). This Act protects the secrecy of 
information relating to nuclear energy and weapons. Papandrea, supra note 17, at 270. As 
applied to whistleblowers, “[it] subjects to criminal penalties anyone who ‘communicates, 
transmits, or discloses’ documents or information ‘involving or incorporating restricted data’ 
with the ‘intent to injure the United States’ or advantage a foreign nation, or who has ‘reason 
to believe such data’ would have that effect.” Id. at 272. 
 58 Intelligence Identities Protection Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 3121 (West 2014). This Act 
prohibits the identification of covert agents. Papandrea, supra note 17, at 274. As applied to 
government whistleblowers, the Act prohibits anyone from disclosing classified information 
that identifies a covert agent to any individual not entitled to receive it. Id. at 274-75. 
 59 18 U.S.C.A. § 641 (West 2014). It imposes criminal penalties not only on anyone who 
“embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or without 
authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the 
United States or of any department or agency thereof,” but also anyone who” receives, 
conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have 
been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted.” Papandrea, supra note 17, at 277. For an 
article arguing that all leakers should be prosecuted under this statute, see Jessica Lutkenhaus, 
Prosecuting Leakers the Easy Way: 18 U.S.C. § 641, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (2014).  The 
government charged Snowden under this provision as well. See Politico, supra note 8.  
 60 18 U.S.C.A. § 792 (West 2014).   
 61 Id.   
 62 See e.g., United States v. Gorin, 312 U.S. 19, 20-21 (1941). 
 63 18 U.S.C.A. § 793 (West 2013).  
 64 Id. 
 65 Id.  
 66 Papandrea, supra note 17, at 265.  
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damaging,67 meaning that it does not have to harm any United States’ interest.  Most 
leakers are commonly charged under § 793(d) of the Espionage Act.68   
Section 794 pertains to the classic case of espionage. It concerns the transfer of 
national defense information, and prohibits its disclosure to an agent of a foreign 
government.69 Additionally, it requires a showing that the whistleblower has the 
“intent or reason to believe that [the information] is to be used to the injury of the 
United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation.70 A person found guilty under 
this section may also face the death penalty.71 Section 794(b) is applicable only “in 
time[s] of war”72 and punishes those who intend to communicate the information “to 
the enemy.”73   
Section 798’s scope for punishment “is staggering.”74 It bans dissemination of 
classified information concerning the communications intelligence activities of the 
United States.75 It requires that the whistleblower do this “knowingly” and 
“willfully.”76 Furthermore, it does not require a showing that the information would 
pose any harm to the United States or provide an advantage to a foreign power.77 
Lastly, the section takes no consideration as to whether or not the information was 
properly classified.78 
As noted, the Espionage Act has been utilized to punish individuals since 1917, 
and it has been relatively unmodified since then. This has led many to call for 
amending the Act to fit today’s high-tech world.79 Furthermore, many fear the 
potentially broad application of the Act to punish institutions like the press.80 Lastly, 
while concerns over the constitutionality of the Act have unsuccessfully been 
                                                                                                                                          
 67 Id.  
 68 Papandrea, supra note 33, at 509. 
 69 18 U.S.C.A § 794 (West 2014).  
 70 Id. at § 794(a).   
 71 Id.  
 72 Id. at § 794(b). This perhaps may have broader implications however, considering how 
often the United States is involved in foreign conflict.  
 73 Id. 
 74 Papandrea, supra note 17, at 269.   
 75 18 U.S.C.A. § 798 (West 2013).  
 76 Id. at § 798(a).  
 77 Id. at § 798; see also Papandrea, supra note 17, at 270.  
 78 Papandrea, supra note 17, at 270.   
 79 See, e.g., Jamie L. Hester, The Espionage Act and Today’s “High-Tech Terrorist,” 12 
N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 177 (2011) (advocating revision of the Act in the advent of computer 
technology and the internet).  
 80 See, e.g., Robert D. Epstein, Balancing National Security and Free-Speech Rights: Why 
Congress Should Revise the Espionage Act, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 483 (2007) (calling 
for Congress to revise the Espionage Act in order to more effectively carry out the Act’s 
purpose of guarding and protecting the national defense of the United States, while at the 
same time protecting the fundamental First Amendment rights of American citizens).  
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
246 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:237 
challenged in the courts,81 many call for a rewriting of the Act to better delineate 
exactly what it punishes.82 
2. The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act and  
Other Statutory Protections 
While there exist statutes that protect national security whistleblowers, those 
protections are few. The general federal whistleblower law, known as the Whistle 
Blower Protection Act of 1989,83 explicitly excludes employees of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the NSA, and other 
national security agencies.84  
Congress sought to remedy this in 1998 by passing the Intelligence Community 
Whistleblower Protection Act (“ICWPA”).85 The Act protects those whistleblowers 
who disclose matters of “urgent concern”86 through the required steps. The Act 
requires that the disclosure first be made to the appropriate Inspector General (“IG”) 
or a designee.87 That IG then assesses the credibility and decides whether or not to 
pursue its merits.88 If the IG determines the report to be credible, he or she must 
forward the report to the head of the intelligence agency within fourteen days.89  A 
flaw remains, however, in the fact that “IGs are appointed and removable by the 
President, and they cannot even report serious wrongdoing to Congress without first 
giving the relevant agency head the opportunity to delete sensitive information.”90 
The ICWPA additionally provides that the employee-whistleblower may report 
directly to congressional intelligence committees only if certain conditions are met.91 
First, he or she may only do so if “the Inspector General fails to accurately transmit 
the report within the 14 day calendar period”92. Second, “the employee, before 
making such a contact, [must] furnish[] the head of the activity, through the 
Inspector General, a statement of the employee’s complaint and notice of the 
employee’s intent to contact the intelligence committees directly.”93 Finally, “the 
                                                                                                                                          
 81 See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655, 658-59 (D. Md. 1985). 
 82 See Epstein, supra note 80. 
 83 Whistle Blower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302 (West 2014).   
 84 Id. at § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii).   
 85 Papandrea, supra note 17, at 247. 
 86 Id. An urgent concern is a serious or flagrant violation of law or executive order, a false 
statement to Congress (or withholding information), or the reprisal against a person who 
reported a matter. Id. 
 87 Id.  
 88 Id.   
 89 Id.  
 90 Papandrea, supra note 33, at 473. Papandrea highlights this flaw by mentioning that the 
CIA’s IG “has never exposed major wrongdoing within the agency that would have otherwise 
gone unexposed.” Id. 
 91 Id. at 493.  
 92 Papandrea, supra note 17, at 247.  
 93 Id. at 247-48.  
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employee [must] obtain[] and follow from the head of the activity, through the 
Inspector General, direction on how to contact the intelligence committees in 
accordance with appropriate security practices.”94  
The ICWPA gives the appearance of protecting national security whistleblowers, 
but in reality it does not provide any substantive protection from retaliation.95 For 
example, those employees who bypass the above procedures and report directly to 
Congress are not protected from retaliation.96 Retaliation may occur through 
revocation of security clearance, “a decision that is generally not subject to 
independent judicial review.”97 Retaliation may also result in an employee’s 
“indefinite suspension or termination.”98 This lack of protection “reduces an 
employee’s willingness to disclose wrongdoings and therefore gives the President 
almost unchecked authority to keep national security information secret.”99 The 
Congressional Research Service supported this conclusion in 2005, finding that “one 
reason federal employees leak information to the press is that the government has 
failed to provide adequate protection for whistleblowers.”100 
Thomas Drake’s experience provides an insight into the lack of protection 
offered by the ICWPA.  A former senior executive at the NSA, Drake had concerns 
about “massive waste, mismanagement, illegality, and a willingness to compromise 
the privacy of U.S. citizens.”101 Drake reported these concerns through the requisite 
channels within the Intelligence Community: his immediate supervisors, the NSA’s 
inspector general, the Department of Defense’s Inspector General, and congressional 
intelligence committees.102 When nothing resulted from these efforts, Drake went to 
a Baltimore Sun reporter with the information that was not even classified.103 Despite 
those mitigating facts, the government charged Drake under the Espionage Act.104 As 
Drake himself noted, “[b]y following protocol, you get flagged–just for raising 
                                                                                                                                          
 94 Id. 
 95 Moberly, supra note 54, at 109.  
 96 Papandrea, supra note 17, at 247.  
 97 Id. at 248; see also Cheney v. Dep’t of Justice, 479 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(holding that neither the Board nor the courts could review the underlying merits of an 
agency’s decision to suspend a security clearance).  
 98 Papandrea, supra note 17, at 248.  
 99 Moberly, supra note 54, at 109.  
 100 Papandrea, supra note 17, at 248; see also LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL33215, NATIONAL SECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS 12-16 (2005).  
 101 Jesselyn Radack & Kathleen McClellan, The Criminalization of Whistleblowing, 2 AM. 
U. LAB. & EMP. L. F. 57, 63 (2011).  
 102 Id.  
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 64. The government eventually dropped all ten felony charges, and Drake pleaded 
guilty to a single misdemeanor charge of “exceeding his authorized use of a computer,” with a 
recommendation from the government of no jail time and no fine. Id. at 65.  
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issues. You’re identified as someone they [the government] don’t like, someone not 
to be trusted.”105 
Drake’s case is not the only example showing the lack of protection offered by 
the ICWPA. Both William (Bill) Binney and J. Kirk Wiebe experienced similar NSA 
retaliation measures due to their activities. Both worked for the NSA, where they 
served for decades.106 Similar to Drake, they blew the whistle on mismanagement 
surrounding a program known as “Trailblazer.”107 Together, they voiced their 
concerns about the program though the appropriate channels, sharing the information 
with the Department of Defense Inspector General and Congress.108 Despite 
following the requisite steps, no one at NSA was held accountable for what some 
have called “one of the worst intelligence failures in history.”109 In response, then-
NSA General Michael Hayden issued an internal memo accusing whistleblowers of 
betraying the agency, stating that “[a]ctions contrary to our decisions will have 
serious adverse effect on our efforts to transform NSA and I cannot tolerate them.”110 
As a result of their whistleblowing, “Binney was demoted to a different position, so 
that he would not have easy access to the Congressional oversight committees” and 
Wiebe, a recipient of the Meritorious Civilian Service Award, the NSA’s second 
highest distinction, was left off potential career advancement projects.111 Witnessing 
continuous wasteful, fraudulent, and unconstitutional behaviors on behalf of the 
NSA, both men retired shortly thereafter.112  
Stories like those above exemplify that current statutory protection for national 
security whistleblowers is illusory, if not non-existent. Knowing that the requisite 
ICWPA procedures usually lead nowhere, whistleblowers must turn to different 
areas for protection. As Part 3 will demonstrate below, courts provide little 
protection for national security whistleblowers as well.  
3. National Security Whistleblowers and the Courts  
As demonstrated above, there is very little statutory protection offered to a 
national security whistleblower under the ICPWA. Accordingly, those individuals 
                                                                                                                                          
 105 Thomas Drake, Snowden Saw What I Saw: Surveillance Criminally Subverting the 
Constitution, THE GUARDIAN (June 12, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2013/jun/12/snowden-surveillance-subverting-constitution.  
 106 NSA Whistleblowers William (Bill) Binney and J. Kirk Wiebe, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
PROJECT, http://www.whistleblower.org/bio-william-binney-and-j-kirk-wiebe (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2014).  
 107 Id.  
 108 Id.  
 109 Id.  
 110 Id.  
 111 Id.  
 112 Id. Despite being retired from the NSA, both men continued to face retaliation from the 
NSA. Id. The NSA prevented their newly formed private company from getting work, and 
caused the contracts they did procure to end abruptly. Id. Furthermore, when the New York 
Times ran their warrantless wiretapping story, both Binney and Wiebe were targeted as being 
the source behind the leak. Id. Agents ransacked their homes despite not being involved in the 
story whatsoever. Id.  
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must rely on the courts’ interpretation of the applicable statutes to their individual 
cases. In United States v. Gorin, the Supreme Court dealt with the interpretation of 
the predecessor provision of Section 793 of the Espionage Act.113 The Court required 
that those prosecuted must have acted in bad faith.114 Furthermore, it found that 
“confidentiality” is a question of fact for the courts to determine, as negligence upon 
disputed facts is determined.115 
The most important case for national security whistleblowers is United States v. 
Morison.116 Samuel Morison was charged with releasing three classified photographs 
to a British magazine where he had been working.117 The court in Morison held that 
the Espionage Act passed constitutional scrutiny118 and that it applied to national 
security whistleblowers.119 As to intent, the court held that under sections 793(d) and 
(e), the only scienter required is the wilful transmission or delivery to one not 
entitled to receive it.120 Furthermore, it was no defense that delivery of documents to 
a person not entitled to receive them was done with “good intentions.”121 
Accordingly, Morison abolishes the “bad faith” requirement, and endorses a wilful 
mens rea. 
Finally, the case United States v. Rosen122 involved two lobbyists who received 
and unlawfully communicated classified information.123 The two lobbyists were 
charged under Section 793(e) of the Espionage Act for the unauthorized possession 
of and wilful communication of information to any persons not entitled to receive 
it.124 The two defendants then moved to dismiss, which the court ultimately 
rejected.125 In rejecting the motion to dismiss, however, Judge Ellis interpreted 
Section 793 to require that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendants knew that the United States held the information at issue closely, that the 
disclosure of such information could potentially harm the United States, and that the 
defendants knew that the individuals to whom they communicated the information 
                                                                                                                                          
 113 Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 19 (1941).   
 114 Id. at 20-21.  
 115 Id. at 32; see also James A. Goldston et al., A Nation Less Secure: Diminished Public 
Access to Information, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 432-33 (1986).  
 116 United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655, 657 (D. Md. 1985). 
 117 Id. at 657.  
 118 Statute was not unconstitutionally vague by failing to give fair warning what documents 
are covered. Id. at 659. Furthermore, the statute is not overbroad where a limiting instruction 
is given. Id. at 660-61. 
 119 Statute applies to the “leaking” of information to the press. Id. at 660.   
 120 Id. at 658-59.   
 121 Id. at 663.  
 122 United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607-08 (E.D. Va. 2006).   
 123 Id.  
 124 Id. at 610, 615. 
 125 Id. at 610, 645. 
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lacked authority to receive it.126 Additionally, Judge Ellis found that Section 793 
requires a bad faith element for conviction.127 
C. Snowden’s Summer of 2013 
In early June and July of 2013, The Guardian and The Washington Post began 
disclosing documents that detailed three expansive NSA surveillance programs.128 
The first program requires telecommunication companies, like Verizon, to provide to 
the NSA on a daily basis “all call detail records or ‘telephony metadata’ created by 
Verizon for communications (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly 
within the United States, including local telephone calls.”129 The second program, 
known as “PRISM,” allows the NSA to access “audio and video chats, photographs, 
e-mails, documents, and connection logs” collected by nine U.S. internet giants like 
Google and Facebook.130 The third program, known as XKeyscore, “provides 
analysts with the capacity to mine content and metadata generated by e-mail, chat, 
and browsing activities through a global network of servers and internet access 
points.”131    
A few days later, Edward Snowden revealed himself as the leaker of the above 
documents.132 Snowden was a former technical assistant for the CIA, as well as an 
employee of the defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton.133 For four years prior to 
the summer of 2013, he worked at the NSA as an employee of various outside 
contractors.134 It was as an employee for the CIA working in Geneva, Switzerland 
where Snowden began thinking about exposing government secrets.135 In Geneva, 
Snowden became “disillusioned…about how [his] government functions and what 
its impact is in the world.”136 He realized that he “was part of something that was 
doing more harm than good.”137  
                                                                                                                                          
 126 Id. at 625; see also Epstein, supra note 80, at 503-04.  
 127 Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 626.  
 128 David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 
63 (2013); see also Kennedy Elliot & Terri Rupar, Six Months of Revelations on NSA, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/nsa-timeline/. 
 129 Gray & Citron, supra note 128, at 63-64. While this program does not allow for the 
collection of content, like conversations, telephony metadata includes a caller’s identity, 
location, and social network. Id. at 64. 
 130 Id.  
 131 Id.  
 132 Greenwald, supra note 1.  
 133 Id.  
 134 Id.  
 135 Id.  
 136 Id.  
 137 Id.  
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Snowden’s biggest fear post-leak was that the public would not embrace these 
disclosures, and that no public debate would be facilitated.138 It is safe to say, as 
many commentators have pointed out, this fear has not come to fruition. As 
mentioned above, the exposure of the NSA surveillance programs has led to 
significant public debate including concerns about civil rights, demands for reform, 
and proposed legislation.139 The international community has also become outraged, 
as reports indicate that the U.S. Government may have been spying on international 
allies, including Germany.140 These allegations have forced the Obama 
Administration to weigh in, too. On January 17, 2014, President Obama “made a 
forceful call to narrow the government’s access to millions of Americans’ phone 
records as part of an overhaul of surveillance activities.”141  
III. FUTURE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: INTRODUCTION TO THE  
MULTI-FACTOR TEST  
As demonstrated above, the time is ripe for the court to allow a national security 
whistleblower to provide a defense for his or her actions. As will be explained in 
further detail below, four main factors should be scrutinized when this defense is 
offered: (1) the whistleblower’s intent; (2) the threat to national security; (3) the 
recipient of the classified documents; and (4) the public debate sparked by the leak.  
A. First Factor—The Requirement of Bad Faith on Behalf of the Whistleblower 
1. A “Bad Faith” Element 
In order to punish a national security whistleblower, a “bad faith” element of 
intent must be required. The government must still prove the required intent to each 
of the elements,142 but an additional element of “bad faith” must be shown. 
Specifically, a showing of bad faith would require that (1) the whistleblower knew 
that the publication of information would create a clear and imminent danger of 
                                                                                                                                          
 138 Glenn Greenwald, Edward Snowden’s Worst Fear Has Not Been Realised – Thankfully, 
THE GUARDIAN (June 14, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/ 
14/edward-snowden-worst-fear-not-realised.  
 139 See Greenwald, supra note 4; Timberg, supra note 5; MacAskill & Dance, supra note 6.  
 140 See Laura Smith-Spark, Germany’s Angela Merkel: Relations with U.S. ‘Severely 
Shaken’ Over Spying Claims, CNN (Oct. 24, 2013, 1:10 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/ 
10/24/world/europe/europe-summit-nsa-surveillance/ (detailing the soured relations with 
Germany, as well as with Mexico and Brazil).  
 141 Ellen Nakashima & Greg Miller, Obama Calls for Significant Changes in Collection of Phone 
Records of U.S. Citizens, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-
speech-obama-to-call-for-restructuring-of-nsas-surveillance-program/2014/01/17/e9d5a8ba-7f6e- 
11e3-95c6-0a7aa80874bc_story.html; see Say What: Breaking Down Obama’s NSA Speech, WASH. 
POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-apps/say-what/say-what-breaking-down-obamas- 
address-on-nsa-reforms/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2014), for a video and copy of the speech. (second 
citation might be cited as state of the union address instead, what do you think?) 
 142 That is, that he (1) knew the information related to national defense, (2) knew that 
injury to the national defense was likely or knew the information would advantage an enemy 
of the United States, (3) intentionally communicated information, and (4) knew that the person 
was not entitled to receive it. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 611 (E.D. Va. 
2006).   
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grave harm to national security;143 and (2) that the whistleblower knew or was 
reckless in not knowing that the publication of this information was “non-
newsworthy.”144  
Additionally, implicit in the intent analysis is consideration of the 
whistleblower’s motive. If the whistleblower discloses information for selfish 
reasons such as monetary enrichment, fame, recognition, or career advancement, he 
or she must be punished. Conversely, if the whistleblower acted unselfishly with the 
intention to inform the public, that evidence must weigh in favor of acquittal. As this 
article emphasizes, no two leaks are created equal.145 A court cannot assume that all 
releases of national security information will be benign in motivation or result.146 A 
bad faith requirement tolerates those whistleblowers who leak for courageous and 
patriotic reasons and punishes those who leak maliciously, due to a variety of 
factors.147  
As noted above, the requirement of “bad faith” is not a novel concept.148 The 
Court in Gorin required that those prosecuted must have acted in bad faith.149 
Furthermore, as Judge Ellis’s opinion stated in Rosen, Section 793 requires a bad 
faith element for conviction when applied to those who receive confidential 
information from a source.150 Federal whistleblower protection law must embrace 
this holding in Gorin and Judge Ellis’s opinion in Rosen, and allow for acquittal of 
those national security whistleblowers who leak government documents in the 
absence of bad faith.  
It can be expected that this element may be difficult to determine in practice. 
Accordingly, it is predictable that any national security whistleblower would simply 
state that he or she acted in good faith when disseminating the information. 
Problematic as this may seem, there are ways around it. “Bad faith” would be a 
determination of fact, left for the fact-finder to determine. The fact-finder would be 
able to assess the credibility of evidence, witnesses, surrounding circumstances, and 
the whistleblower, should he or she choose to testify. Modern jurors make these 
determinations every day in criminal cases nationwide. Thus, it is logical that this 
practice applies to national security whistleblower cases as well.  
                                                                                                                                          
 143 Geoffrey R. Stone, Prosecuting the Press for Publishing Classified Information, 2 FIU 
L. REV. 93, 95 (2007). 
 144 Id.; see also discussion of “non-newsworthy” information infra Part III.B.  
 145 McCraw & Gikow, supra note 12, at 498.  
 146 Bellia, supra note 36, at 1505.  
 147 Id.  
 148 In fact, there is great support that the original framers of the Espionage Act thought it 
necessary that bad faith element be necessary for conviction. See Goldston, supra note 115, at 
421-25. Supporters of the 1917 bill stressed that “the objective was to punish spying in the 
classic sense, and not to restrict public discussion of defense matters.” Id. at 422. Supporters 
of the 1950 amendments again stressed their exclusive application to classic espionage. Id. at 
423. Most significantly, “the final House report on the amendments explained that, under the 
espionage statutes, ‘unauthorized revelation . . . can be penalized only if it can be proved that 
the person making the revelation did so with an intent to injure the United States.” Id.    
 149 Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 20-21 (1941). 
 150 United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607-08 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
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Furthermore, while intent is given great weight in this analysis, it should not be 
determinative. Each national security leak is different than the next, and convictions 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis. For example, suppose a national 
security whistleblower acts in bad faith when disclosing the information, but the 
information disclosed is highly beneficial to public debate. Again, the jury must 
determine the question of whether the benefits of the disclosure outweigh the bad 
intent of the whistleblower. If the information disclosed is highly beneficial, it seems 
likely that the whistleblower should face less severe sanctions. Conversely, imagine 
a scenario where a national security whistleblower acts in good faith when disclosing 
the information, but the information, unbeknownst to the whistleblower, is highly 
damaging to national security.151 Situations like this place the nation in grave danger, 
and that fact must outweigh a whistleblower’s good intent.  
In short, the national security whistleblower’s bad faith in disclosure is an 
important factor that must be considered by the courts. That said, it should not be 
determinative. Each of the following factors must be weighed against the bad faith 
factor in order to determine, if necessary, the appropriate level of punishment. 
2. Daniel Ellsberg and the “Pentagon Papers:” Exemplar of Good Faith 
One way a fact-finder may reach a determination concerning the national security 
whistleblower’s intent is to look at how much information he or she disclosed. Take, 
for example, the source behind the “Pentagon Papers,” Daniel Ellsberg. In 1971, The 
New York Times began publishing a massive 1967-1969 government study 
concerning U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.152 The news publishers, The New 
York Times and The Washington Post, possessed forty-three volumes of the Defense 
Department’s history of the Vietnam War,153 several cables, position papers, and 
memoranda exchanged among high-level administrative officials.154  
While it seems like the news publishers had a magnitude of information, they did 
not have everything. Ellsberg specifically chose not to disseminate “four volumes 
dealing with diplomatic relations.”155 Ellsberg withheld these documents “out of 
concern that their release would disrupt diplomatic efforts to end the war.”156 
Ellsberg’s goal was not to place the nation in grave danger, but rather to inform the 
public of U.S. involvement in a highly controversial war.157 Even though the 
                                                                                                                                          
 151 Some scholars refer to this scenario as the “mosaic theory.” See Christina E. Wells, 
State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 625, 635 (2010). According 
to the mosaic theory, “intelligence work is ‘akin to the construction of a mosaic’ where an 
item of information seems (or is) insignificant standing alone, but actually has great 
importance to one who pieces the innocuous information together.” Id.  
 152 Bellia, supra note 36, at 1454-55.  
 153 McCraw & Gikow, supra note 12, at 483.  
 154 Bellia, supra note 36, at 1455.  
 155 McCraw & Gikow, supra note 12, at 483.  
 156 Bellia, supra note 36, at 1466.  
 157 See 1971 Year in Review: The Pentagon Papers, UPI (1971), 
http://www.upi.com/Archives/Audio/Events-of-1971/The-Pentagon-Papers/?spt=nil&d=n. As 
Daniel Ellsberg said himself, “I felt that as an American citizen, as a responsible citizen, I 
could no longer cooperate in concealing this information from the American public.” Id. 
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government argued the potential harm of publication of these materials, no harm 
resulted.  
3. Samuel Morison and His Quest for Employment  
A national security whistleblower’s bad faith can likewise be inferred from the 
surrounding circumstances. Most cases involve the whistleblower acting in a selfish 
manner, and not in the public’s interest. The case of Samuel Morison provides an 
illustrative example. Morison worked at the Naval Intelligence Support Center, with 
top-secret clearance.158 He also worked part-time for the British publisher of Jane’s 
Fighting Ship and Jane’s Defence Weekly.159 He was convicted for disseminating 
pictures and summaries of naval secrets.160 The court found that Morison “was 
making available secret material to . . . Jane’s as a means of furthering his 
application for employment by Jane’s and for payment.”161 Although there was no 
direct statement about compensation, past practice indicated that “when [Morison] 
had in the past furnished material of interest, Jane’s had paid [Morison].”162  
Morison’s case exemplifies this bad faith standard in two regards. First, it is clear 
that he acted in pursuit of his own interests. He disseminated classified information 
to a potential employer for hope of employment and monetary gain. Second, his 
leaks, although claiming to be patriotic, were not made in the public interest. The 
leaks involved a detailed report about an explosion at the shipyard, and pictures of 
that explosion. Neither would be of any interest to the public, yet Morison decided to 
disclose such information in bad faith.  
4. Edward Snowden: Daniel Ellsberg of the Twenty-First Century?  
Difficulties arise when applying this factor to Snowden’s case today. Everything 
we know of Snowden’s intent comes from sources that believe he is either a “hero” 
or a “traitor.” Publications will thus be slanted in accordance with that view. 
Nonetheless, these sources provide early glimpses into what evidence may be 
introduced should Snowden face trial.  
An interesting place to start is Edward Snowden’s “Manifesto” that he published 
a few months after the initial disclosures.163 Although brief, it allows an outsider to 
ascertain Snowden’s state of mind. The NSA programs in his mind were “not only a 
threat to privacy,” but also “threaten[ed] freedom of speech and open societies.”164 
                                                                                                                                          
 158 William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 
AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1479 (2008).  
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 161 Morison, 844 F.2d at 1062.  
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When encountered with programs such as these, Snowden believes that “[w]e have a 
moral duty to ensure that our laws and values limit monitoring programs and protect 
human rights.”165 Understanding and controlling these problems can only be 
accomplished “through an open, respectful and informed debate.”166 When the 
government is dishonest and hides matters of public importance, Snowden believes it 
is up to citizens to “fight suppression” of this type of information, and to tell the 
truth.167 Snowden’s own text comes across as a plea for transparency and an 
informed and courageous citizenry. His “Manifesto” implies that his intent behind 
these disclosures was to inform the public, both nationally and worldwide, about the 
presumed powers that governments possess.  
Interviews with Snowden after the incident confirm this. Despite coming 
forward, Snowden repeatedly says that he does not want media attention.168 He 
insists rather, he wants the focus of the debate “to be about what the U.S. 
government is doing.”169 Snowden stated that his “sole motive is to inform the public 
as to that which is done in their name and that which is done against them.”170 
Despite having a very comfortable life prior to the disclosures, he was willing to 
sacrifice much of his own freedom in order to secure “privacy, internet freedom and 
basic liberties for people around the world.”171 Snowden claims that he was not 
motivated by fame or money, but rather he felt that “[t]he government has granted 
itself power it is not entitled to” with these programs.172 While Snowden admires 
Chelsea Manning,173 he believes there is one important distinction between him (he) 
and Manning: 
I carefully evaluated every single document I disclosed to ensure that each 
was legitimately in the public interest. There are all sorts of documents 
that would have made a big impact that I didn’t turn over, because 
harming people isn’t my goal. Transparency is.174 
Snowden obviously then sees himself more akin to Daniel Ellsberg, describe above, 
as selectively releasing documents that he believed would not result in harming the 
nation.  
                                                                                                                                          
 165 Id.  
 166 Id.  
 167 Id.  
 168 Greenwald, supra note 1.  
 169 Id. According to Snowden, he “really want[ed] the focus to be on these documents and 
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Yet others do not buy into Snowden’s “for the public” mantra. Some suggest that 
Snowden has been planning on releasing these documents since 2011, when he was 
working for Dell.175 The argument continues by insinuating that Snowden 
purposefully switched employers to Booz Allen Hamilton in order to “gain access to 
additional top-secret documents that could be leaked.”176 Others suggest that 
Snowden disclosed these documents with fame and recognition in mind, rather than 
the public interest.177 Jeffrey Toobin suggests that Snowden is “a grandiose 
narcissist” who unveiled “legally authorized programs” because they “failed to meet 
his own standards of propriety.”178 Snowden, Toobin believes, set a bad precedent 
for government employees and contractors to “sabotage programs they don’t like.”179 
Fox News analyst Ralph Peters argues that Snowden’s leaks constituted “treason,” 
and that the death penalty should be his punishment.180 Peters believes that 
Snowden’s action constituted “foreign policy making,” something he is not capable 
of doing.181 
As stated above, it is difficult to ascribe a motive to Snowden based purely on 
these sorts of publications. However, these sources exemplify how a fact-finder must 
judge the motives of Snowden—based on a totality of the circumstances. A jury 
makes findings as to motive frequently; they are more than competent to do so in 
Snowden’s case.  
B. Second Factor–Type of Document Leaked 
In most cases, national security whistleblowers get into trouble when they leak 
classified documents. Most of the time, the classification level determines the 
perceived threat to national security. For example, as mentioned above, the current 
Order182 classifying documents has three levels, each corresponding to a different 
threat to national security.183 As a nation at war more often than at peace,184 some 
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information must be kept secret in order to advance our national security interests.185 
With this vast power comes great responsibility, and, as mentioned above, 
oftentimes the classification system is abused.  
Accordingly, courts should look at the classified information to determine 
whether or not it is classified correctly. Professor Geoffrey Stone has provided an 
analytical framework that may prove helpful in a national security whistleblower 
context.186 He argues that there are three types of government secrets: “illegitimate” 
government secrets; “legitimate but newsworthy” government secrets; and 
“legitimate and non-newsworthy” government secrets.187 Using this framework, a 
court would be able to look at the confidentiality of the document while at the same 
time assessing the threat to national security. In theory, we should never punish a 
whistleblower who releases illegitimate secrets and always punish a whistleblower 
that falls under the third category.188 Although the second category presents the more 
difficult task of scrutinizing those secrets that are legitimate, but newsworthy, it is a 
proper task for the court to undertake.  
1. Illegitimate Government Secrets 
“Illegitimate” secrets are those secrets that do nothing in any way to further the 
public good.189 This often includes information that is made secret in an attempt to 
“hide an embarrassing or damning truth from public scrutiny.”190 This use of 
confidentiality runs afoul of democratic ideals of transparency, and must be exposed. 
Whistleblowers with access to these types of secrets are in a unique position. While 
the current law may discourage these whistleblowers from exposing any secrets,191 it 
is vital in a constitutional democracy that such deception be fettered out and 
exposed.192   
2. Legitimate But Newsworthy Government Secrets 
As mentioned above, legitimate but newsworthy government secrets present the 
greatest challenge for a court. Obviously, the government has the right to keep things 
secret in order to protect national security. When these types of secrets are properly 
classified we can call them “legitimate.” Yet, at the same time, exposing these 
“legitimate” secrets may also have salutary and substantial value as a step towards 
the truth.193 When these types of secrets are involved, courts would then have to 
balance the national security interest against the public interest in obtaining the 
information.  
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A hypothetical scenario illustrates the conundrum. Suppose the government 
learns of inadequacies involving security at domestic nuclear power plants.194 The 
government may definitely assert that exposure of this knowledge would present a 
threat to national security.195 At the same time, the public would be interested in this 
material.196 If the public knew, it would foster a healthy debate on the necessity to 
update security.197 Unfortunately, these legitimate but newsworthy instances happen 
more often than not.198 When confronted with this dilemma, courts should rule in 
favor of national security.   
3. Legitimate and Non-Newsworthy Government Secrets 
The third category involves those secrets which would harm national security if 
they were disclosed, and at the same time, contribute very little to informed public 
debate.199 Determining whether or not information is non-newsworthy offers some 
additional challenges, but it is not an impossible test to overcome. A recent example 
would be the intelligence activities surrounding the raid on Osama bin Laden’s 
compound in Pakistan. Everyone likely understood the absolute necessity to have 
kept secret the operation that found Osama bin Laden in order to catch him by 
surprise.200 Keeping this information classified is therefore justified. At the same 
time, keeping the public in the dark was also justified because any exposed 
information may have led to bin Laden’s escape. Accordingly, the information of 
intelligence activities surrounding the raid is properly classified as a “legitimate and 
non-newsworthy” secret.  
4. The NSA’s Telephony Metadata Program: Legitimate or Not?  
When applying this factor to Snowden’s case, a court may analyze this a few 
ways. First, it may rule on the underlying NSA program that has been disclosed. If 
the program is determined to be unconstitutional, keeping it secret would be 
“illegitimate.” On the other hand, if the program is determined to be constitutional, it 
may qualify as a “legitimate” secret. Second, a court may also look at the national 
security risk disclosure poses. If that risk is substantial, keeping it secret may again 
be “legitimate.”  
Fortunately, two courts have recently ruled on the NSA telephony program’s 
constitutionality, each reaching a different determination. On December 16, 2013, 
District Judge Richard J. Leon of the District of Columbia ruled that the NSA’s bulk 
telephony metadata program may be unconstitutional.201 He distinguishes Smith v. 
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Maryland,202 a Supreme Court decision holding that individuals have no “legitimate 
expectation of privacy” regarding the telephone numbers they dial because they 
knowingly give that information to telephone companies when they dial a number.203 
Judge Leon opined that “present-day circumstances” have “become so thoroughly 
unlike those considered” in Smith that it does not apply to this case.204 He found that 
the NSA surveillance techniques are much different than those employed in Smith,205 
the relationship between telecommunication providers and the government is much 
different than it was in Smith,206 the ability of the government to analyze the 
metadata collected is much different,207 and most importantly, the nature and 
quantity of the metadata is much greater and that people’s cellphone habits 
nowadays indicate that they have a reasonable expectation of privacy.208 Finding that 
a Fourth Amendment search took place in the case, Judge Leon held that there is a 
significant likelihood that plaintiffs will succeed in showing that the searches are 
unreasonable, and thus in violation of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.209  
Just eleven days later, however, on December 27, 2013, District Judge William 
H. Pauley III of the Southern District of New York ruled that the exact same 
program was constitutional.210 Unlike Judge Leon, Judge Pauley relied heavily on 
Smith v. Maryland to find that the NSA’s telephony metadata program does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.211 Judge Pauley dismissed the ACLU’s contention 
that the NSA’s “telephony metadata program allows the creation of a rich mosaic,” 
potentially revealing an individual’s religious and political beliefs, contemplation of 
suicide, addictions to gambling or drugs, experience with rape, and grappling with 
sexuality212 by stating: 
[A]t least three inflections from the Government’s bulk telephony 
metadata collection [protect this from occurring]. First, without additional 
legal justification—subject to rigorous minimization procedures—the 
NSA cannot even query the telephony metadata base. Second, when it 
makes a query, it only learns the telephony metadata of the telephone 
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numbers within three “hops” of the “seed.” Third, without resort to 
additional techniques, the Government does not know who any of the 
telephone numbers belong to.213 
Furthermore, the phone records do not belong to the ACLU, but rather to Verizon or 
telephone providers.214 Additionally, the NSA probing into that data is akin to FBI 
analysis of fingerprint data, which is perfectly constitutional.215 Finally, Judge 
Pauley held that it “is unnecessary to decide whether there could be a First 
Amendment violation in the absence of a Fourth Amendment violation.”216 
As each Judge did the above cases, a court in Snowden’s case must also look at 
the efficiency of the underlying program to determine whether or not keeping it a 
secret is “legitimate.” As can be expected, both Judges came to different conclusions 
as to the effectiveness of the NSA’s telephony metadata collection program. Judge 
Leon noted that there was an “utter lack of evidence that a terrorist attack has ever 
been prevented because the NSA database was faster than other investigative 
tactics,” which led him to have “serious doubts about the efficacy of the metadata 
collection program.”217 
Judge Pauley on the other hand, believed that the “effectiveness of bulk 
telephony metadata collection cannot be seriously disputed.”218 He cited three 
specific examples of how the programs have led to information and the capture of 
terrorist suspects.219 He also noted that these programs are not the only means to 
prevent terrorism, but rather significant tools in the grand goal of preventing 
terrorism.220 Obviously, public officials agree with Judge Pauley, saying that “at least 
50 threats . . .have been averted because of this information” worldwide.221 
Independent research, however, has led to conclusions more in line with Judge 
Leon’s misgivings about the program. One report, which analyzed 225 individuals 
associated with terrorists cells and charged in the United States with an act of 
terrorism since 9/11, concluded that the contribution of the “NSA’s bulk surveillance 
programs…was minimal.”222 Rather, traditional investigative methods, “such as the 
use of informants, tips from local communities, and targeted intelligence 
operations,” were the starting points for investigation in the majority of cases.223 
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Another report referenced the examples Judge Pauley cited, and concluded that the 
bulk phone records collection did not make a significant contribution to stopping the 
terrorist plot.224  
Review of the NSA bulk telephony metadata program’s constitutionality and its 
efficacy in protecting national security leads this author to conclude that this type of 
secret should not be classified as “legitimate and non-newsworthy.” While the 
constitutionality of the program is still being debated,225 it is clear that the program 
does not produce the claimed results. Snowden, by exposing this program, did not 
disclose any information that would jeopardize national security. Rather, he provided 
the impetus to a worldwide debate concerning an invasive, yet largely inefficient 
surveillance program.   
C. Third Factor—The Recipient of the Classified Information 
As a third factor of the test, the court should take into account the recipient of the 
classified information. Clearly, if the recipient was a foreign government, weight of 
that fact would more easily contribute to a conviction. The scenario becomes more 
nuanced when the recipient is a media outlet. Below I highlight two media outlets – 
traditional news publishers and nontraditional news publishers. Whistleblowers who 
leak documents to traditional news publishers are more deserving of protection than 
those who leak the documents to nontraditional news publishers. The reasons for this 
conclusion are also highlighted below.  
1. Traditional News Publishers 
Traditional news publishers are press establishments like The New York Times 
and The Washington Post. Traditional news publishers have provided external 
restraints on government officials dating back to the American Revolution.226 
History reflects that these two institutions, the press and the government, have 
exhibited what some call a practice of “mutual restraint.”227 The basic idea of mutual 
restraint is the press “embraced an ethos of responsibility and the government 
generally treated leaks as an accepted, if not fully condoned, part of modern 
democratic governance.”228 The government rarely wants the information published, 
but together the two entities work out a solution. In turn, the government almost 
never attempts to block publishers from writing these stories.  
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The New York Times’ handling of the NSA wiretapping scandal highlighted an 
example of this mutual restraint. In the early 2000s, The New York Times learned of 
a classified program in which the NSA was monitoring phone calls that came into 
the United States from abroad.229 The paper consulted with government officials who 
assured them that publication of this information would undermine an important tool 
in the fight against terrorism.230 As a result, the Times held onto the story, and 
undertook its own research.231 The Times finally published the information after 
extensive additional reporting whereby it concluded that the story would not provide 
useful information to terrorists.232 This scenario reminds us that the “press has 
exercised remarkable self-restraint by routinely considering the ramifications of its 
publications and frequently holding stories or limiting their scope in order to soften 
their impact.”233 
2. Nontraditional News Publishers 
Nontraditional publishers are “the product of new technology and new 
distribution channels, and they appear to be constrained only by the number of 
people willing to create them.”234 The prototypical example of these news publishers 
is WikiLeaks, which operates on the philosophy that it opens governments235 to the 
public. It prides itself on being an online clearinghouse of confidential documents 
“in order to expose injustices in the world and try to rectify them.”236 Nontraditional 
publishers, such as WikiLeaks, present a legitimate threat to national security, 
government power, and the viability of mutual restraint.237  
The Chelsea (f.k.a. Bradley) Manning case provided an example of this threat. In 
2010, WikiLeaks announced that it possessed 251,287 cables originating from the 
U.S. State Department and 274 U.S. embassies and consulates around the world.238 
WikiLeaks began releasing this information in bits. The first bit involved 220 cables, 
which were also given to The New York Times, The Guardian, Der Spiegel, Le 
Monde, and El Pais.239 The newspapers each consulted with the State Department in 
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order to redact certain information, such as the names of individuals who spoke 
privately with diplomats.240 WikiLeaks originally did the same, releasing early sets 
of cables in redacted form.241 Beginning in August 2011, however, WikiLeaks began 
releasing large batches of unredacted cables.242  
In sum, the journalistic approaches advanced by traditional news publishers 
versus non-traditional news publishers vary significantly. While the traditional 
publishers conducted further reporting prior to publication, and decided to leave out 
names and other details after talking with government officials, WikiLeaks posted 
unredacted documents, exposing, among other things, the identities of foreign 
nationals in contact with U.S. embassies around the world.243 Accordingly, leaks 
have a tremendous potential to cause significant damage when released to these non-
traditional publishers rather than the traditional publishers.  
As the above analysis demonstrates, the recipient of the leak must be factored 
into an analysis of the harm caused by the overall leak. Furthermore, it can provide 
an incentive to a would-be whistleblower to disclose the information to a traditional 
news publisher rather than a nontraditional news publisher. 
3. The Washington Post and The Guardian: Twenty-First  
Century Traditional Publishers 
Snowden disclosed the classified NSA telephony metadata collection program to 
two traditional news publishers: The Washington Post and British publisher The 
Guardian.244 Both began publishing documents received from Snowden in early June 
2013. Even in Snowden’s case however, The Washington Post demonstrated 
responsible journalism by investigating further before printing the classified 
information. Among the documents leaked to these publishers were forty-one slides 
detailing specific NSA programs.245 The Washington Post decided to only publish 
four of these slides.246  
A few members of the press, however, are concerned with the journalistic 
approach advocated by Glenn Greenwald, Snowden’s main contact at The 
Guardian.247 In a conversation with Bill Smith of The New York Times, Greenwald 
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argues that journalists must present their own opinions on news stories, and those 
opinions must be “grounded in facts, evidence, and verifiable data.”248 When it 
comes to publications that threaten national security, Greenwald argues that the “pre-
publication process is both journalistically sensible . . . and legally wise.”249 He 
argues that he has done this for each article he has published concerning Snowden’s 
NSA disclosures.250 What he won’t stand for is blind adherence to administrative 
wishes in the absence of any specific evidence or reason for journalistic 
suppression.251 
The fact that Snowden disclosed the NSA information in this case to these two 
publishers may not have any impact on the current analysis. The information 
received was somewhat limited. When more information is disclosed, as in the 
Manning situation, the recipient may have a bigger impact on the analysis. As 
discussed above, traditional publishers tend to err on the side of caution and the 
protection of national security interests. That fact makes disclosures to these 
publishers more appealing, and calls for less severe punishment of those 
whistleblowers.  
D. Fourth Factor—The Public Interest and Debate Sparked by the Leak 
Under the fourth component of the test, two main issues must be reviewed: the 
public interest in the leak and the public debate sparked by the leak. These 
considerations allow a court to analyze two critical time periods: the time before the 
leak and the time after the leak.   
1. Public Interest in the Leak 
This element looks at the nature of the leak before exposure. It should be looked 
at objectively: “Would a reasonable, prudent citizen of the United States of America 
be interested in this material?” If the answer is yes, then the national security 
whistleblower is more justified in releasing the material. Again, a certain degree of 
transparency must be had in order to hold those in power accountable.252 When those 
in power purposefully use the system to hide their transgressions, it is sometimes up 
to the courageous whistleblower to “air their dirty laundry.” 
United States v. Progressive, Inc.253 is an illustrative example of public interest 
pre-leak. In Progressive, the magazine wished to publish “The H-Bomb Secret: How 
We Got It - - Why We’re Telling It.”254 The Department of Energy (“DOE”) argued 
that the article contained restricted information, and the court initially granted a 
temporary restraining order (“TRO”).255 The court reasoned that there was “no 
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plausible reason why the public needed to know the technical details about hydrogen 
bomb construction.”256  
While the initial TRO was eventually overturned,257 the district court’s rationale 
provides an interesting standard for the present test: Is there any plausible reason 
why the public would need to know the information? If so, a whistleblower would be 
justified in releasing this information.  
2. Public Debate Sparked by the Leak 
Courts often take into account what happens down the road from the crime258 or 
the alleged wrongdoing.259 This same analysis should apply to a national security 
setting. When confronted with a national security whistleblower, a court should first 
ask: Did any actual damage result from the leak? An affirmative answer would favor 
criminal charges; an answer in the negative would lead to acquittal.260 The damage to 
national security must be real and actual, not a conglomerate of effects that leads to 
damage in theory. As mentioned above, embarrassment is not sufficient damage to 
national security so as to preclude disclosure. 
A second question for a court to ask is whether the leak led to any meaningful 
public debate. A leak that did not result in any damage but did not lead to any 
meaningful debate or enhanced transparency is utterly useless and promotes 
disobedience. Leaks of this ilk would favor punishment. However, leaks that do not 
pose harm—such as the Pentagon Papers—or that meaningfully enhance 
transparency—like the disclosures of illegal operations—should not be a target for 
government sanction.261 Placing an emphasis on the actual result of the leak would 
encourage leaks for the public benefit—resulting in the exposure of potential 
governmental abuses to the voters who then debate and determine how to react. A 
leak of this sort encourages the democratic ideals on which our government was 
founded. 
3. Public Interest in the NSA Disclosures 
a. Pre-Leak: The Front Page Test 
Snowden’s approach in determining whether or not to disseminate the classified 
information exemplifies the standard advocated above – “Is there any plausible 
reason why the public would need to know the information?” Snowden employed 
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what he called “the front-page test” to determine interest in the information.262 
Beginning more than one-year prior to the leaks, Snowden began showing 
colleagues detailed maps which demonstrated the fact that the NSA was collecting 
more data on Americans in the United States than the Russian government collected 
on its people.263 Snowden would then ask, “[w]hat do you think the public would do 
if this was on the front page?”264  
The fact-finder must first try to forget about the present day effect the leaks had 
on society and put themselves into their own shoes before their leak. When that is 
done, the public interest in the programs Snowden disclosed seems overwhelming. 
While many may argue that the information disclosed was already known to the 
public,265 it would be hard to argue the public knew the extent of the programs. It is 
very plausible that the public would take great interest in an Orwellian program 
designed to keep them safe. 
b. Post-Leak 
As stated above, a court must consider the actual result of the leak. First it must 
consider whether damage to national security occurred. While it may still be too 
early to determine, forecasts suggest that no damage to national security occurred in 
Snowden’s case. As discussed above, the value to national security of the NSA’s 
bulk metadata collection program was questionable prior to the disclosures.266 It 
makes sense then that the damage to national security caused by his disclosure is 
minimal, if any. Furthermore, the fact that these disclosures may have embarrassed 
the United States government carries no significant weight. Government 
embarrassment is not a valid excuse for secrecy, and the government’s 
embarrassment on the worldwide scale in this case should not be considered.  
Second, a court must consider whether the leak led to any meaningful debate. As 
thoroughly demonstrated above, Snowden’s actions have led to changes in public 
opinion as to national security and civil rights, demands for reform, proposed 
legislation, administrative change, and worldwide debate.267 It is without question 
that Snowden’s disclosures provided the catalyst to this debate. It is safe to say that 
Snowden’s leak meaningfully enhanced transparency within our government, and 
furthered democratic ideals on which our country was founded.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
As Professor Patricia L. Bellia rightfully noted, factors like the sheer volume of 
information, the problem of overclassification, the breadth of access to information, 
and the ease of reproduction of information all make national security leaks more 
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likely to occur.268 Additionally, as noted above, we cannot assume that all leaks are 
equal and that they will jeopardize national security.269 Some provide significant 
benefits to society while others may cause severe harm. The proposed multi-factor 
test addresses these concerns by weighing the different set of facts provided in order 
to determine whether or not the national security whistleblower should be punished.  
Whether or not one agrees with the application of these factors to Snowden’s 
case is not the point of this paper. Rather, Snowden’s case provided a timely 
scenario to exemplify how these factors may be applied to future national security 
whistleblowers. Edward Snowden will not be the last whistleblower our country and 
government encounters. More will follow. How we treat these individuals may 
determine the benefits that future leaks provide. A multi-factor test, like the one 
proposed, offers the whistleblower substantive protection while at the same time 
keeps secure national security interests.   
  
                                                                                                                                          
 268 Bellia, supra note 36, at 1520.  
 269 McCraw & Gikow, supra note 12, at 498.  
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